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Abstract: This paper deals with the moral hazard problem associated with the behavior of corporate managers. 
The stockholders (shareholders) cannot control ex ante the managers, because the latter’s action is unobservable 
to the former, and the stockholders cannot oblige the managers to choose an action which is effective and benefit 
both parties. The stockholders may not modify the impact of action taken by managers if and only if they decide 
to condition the action payment to the final observable income. In the specific context of emerging markets listed 
companies in where the level of opacity and the inefficiency to monitor are very high, the revelation principle 
does not play correctly. Therefore, it is not interesting to the Agent to show his true type. In this Paper we will 
specifically deal with this type of problem within the framework of companies listed in the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange. Our approach consists to show the moral hazard issue existing between two parties: the stockholders 
(i.e., uninformed “Principal”) and the manager namely the Chief Executive Officer (i.e., informed “Agent”). 
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1. Introduction 
The complexity of management, the hierarchical power of managers and their entrenched 
place in the organization chart, the high-level docility of subordinates, the implication of 
subordinates in the corruption affairs and the disclosure of private information with “tacit” or 
“no tacit” knowledge and manager agreement, the subjectivity in the decision-making are the 
main situations of corporate moral hazard issue. In addition, the subjective evaluation and 
overestimation of risks and charges, the scapegoat policy that the manager can practice 
against his subordinates, his corrupt and dubious relations with the third parties (customers, 
suppliers, bankers and tax authorities) can be considered as a main source of the moral hazard 
problem in the case of listed companies in the developing countries. Generally speaking, the 
phenomenon becomes more and more complicated when the manager weaves a network of 
relations and forms the coalitions with other partners and some external “stakeholders”. 
Agents with the common interest can form implicit or explicit coalition and react commonly, 
as a group. In this case, an individual (or a group of individuals) is able to accept or endure 
the burden, despite his innocence. Indeed, it’s clear that the behavior of a group acts 
individually and/or collectively with a rational way. In the opposite case, i.e., where the Agent 
behavior diverges from that of the group, the game solution is sub-optimal in the meaning of 
Pareto equilibrium.        
By claiming to fix the game rules, the tasks and responsibilities of the players, without being 
able to foresee the players’ reactions and their conflicting relationship, the governance loses 
its quality to manage conflicts and to improve the company performance. Indeed, the 
governance environment often becomes uncertain. In the case of listed companies in the pre-
emerging markets, the good governance can give the priority to the efficiency if and only if it 
can base on the penalty/reward system. 
In some organizations, the efficiency is judged purely from the ultimate goal of increased 
dividends and Value Company. In the other words, the measured company outputs are purely 
financial. Now, a penalty/reward system is only workable if and only if the action of Agent is 
observable (under the first rank equilibrium). Today we know that the majority of contracts 
which signed between the “Principal” and the “Agent” are entered into the environment which 
characterized by asymmetric information. 
2. The Corporate Governance: A Literature Review 
Given the multiform character of relations between the different actors of corporate 
organization, we cannot aspire to a unique and common definition of corporate governance in 
the all-different situations. In fact, we can define the corporate governance under two possible 
approaches: the first is limited to a contractual vision (based on the Principal/Agent theory) 
and given a sort of conflict management as typical because it is based on the binary relation as 
shareholders/managers or property/decision or stockholders/managers. This approach takes 
place to reach the shareholders’ welfare through the Value Company optimization. On the 
other hand, the second approach is called “stakeholder governance”, in which the 
stakeholder’s notion is accentuated with the fact that all internal and external parties of 
company are actively engaged. 
According to the first approach, the good governance is limited to the effectiveness of control 
and means to implement it with a minimal scale of costs. 
Indeed, given the many difficulties to implement the control with high efficiency, the 
“stakeholder” approach based on the partnership and participation has been developed. It 
based on the arbitration between power and responsibility (Charkham on 1994). The latter 
takes the form of an endogenous variable. The actual power exercised by the managers is 
limited and administrative responsibility is shared and prolix. Indeed, the manager is 
considered both an Agent and Principal (Castanias and Helfat on 1991, Blair 1995, Charreaux 
on 1995, Charreaux and Desbrières on 1998, Rajan and Zingales on 1998, Zingales on 2002). 
It has been conceived within the framework of a cooperative and collusive game. In this case, 
once substitute the satisfaction in the optimization, the cooperation in the conflict, the tasks 
participation in the tasks subcontracting and division, the seeking value realization in the 
maximisation of utility. 
Along similar ideas’, some authors attempt to resolve the agency relationship in a positive 
way within the framework of “stakeholder governance”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) first 
proposed a moral-hazard explanation of agency conflicts. Indeed, it assumed that the manager 
had “an incentive to consume private perquisites, rather than investing in positive net present 
value (NPV) projects, increases as his ownership stake in the company declines”.1 
As quoted by McColgan (2001), “the moral-hazard problems are likely to be more paramount 
in larger companies, Jensen (1993). While larger firms attract more external monitoring, 
increasing firm size expands the complexity of the firm’s contracting nexus exponentially. 
This will have the effect of increasing the difficulty of monitoring, and therefore, increase 
these costs”.2 
As stated by Jensen (1986), being a large and mature firm and without cash flow problems 
can increase the difficulties created by moral hazard. Furthermore, when managers have big 
funds at their disposal, without any strong demand for investment opportunities, the private 
perquisites consumption can increase dramatically as it becomes more costly for shareholders 
to monitor and determine how corporate funds are used. In developing countries, the moral 
hazard problems are often related both to the lack of management effort and to the decreasing 
in incentive to work. 
Indeed, it is also noted that the contractual system of corporate governance can be established 
as an alternative. It is considered as a cooperative system where the various partners interact 
with their various interests. The cooperative game does not show the absence of conflicts 
between the engaging parties of company. In the conflict case, the cooperative governance 
mechanisms interact contractually (by using the “power” of contracts, or globally by using the 
“power” of extra-contractual mechanisms) in order to discipline, to alter or to bend the 
decision-making of manager. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen what is necessary and sufficient means need to be set up to 
arrive at this coherence, at this arbitration (or trade-off) between the internal engaging parties 
to result in a performance of the company and a satisfaction of the external engaging parties. 
The American and German experiences can teach us a few more or less success examples of 
this. Indeed, the realization of the Value Company can result from two major elements: the 
participation of all the internal engaging parties in the capital of the company (the managers 
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and employees become shareholders) and the power organization of company is based on 
matrix approach to organization. 
Given that, we cannot consider that the stakeholder issue is a shape of perfect governance, 
even less as a perfect mechanism to discover the cheating and dishonesty. We note that, 
within a Public Offering, the partners’ strategy of company is often contingent upon divergent 
aspirations. Both parties are motivated by the search for mostly contradictory self-interests. 
The highly-rated value of company can be resulted by the market speculation and by the 
disinformation which is maintained by the managers’ manipulations especially at the moment 
of stock listing. 
The partnership approach to governance should also enable an effective response, one that 
guarantees to individual an effective influence on the decision making through various means: 
a means of control, auditing, management of decision process, pressure and even consensus.  
In reality, the process of consensus building is not without its vicissitudes for the proper 
functioning of the organization: the temporary hierarchical coalitions and ad hoc (between the 
manager and the subordinates, between the shareholders and the managers, between the 
Supervisory board and the Executive Board, between the Labor Unions and the manager 
and/or the shareholders, etc.) can be formed instead of some groups (workers, minority 
shareholders, etc.). Furthermore, any form of coalition is likely to cause leaks of insider 
information. 
In this context, the process of creation and distribution of Value Company is ambivalent: on 
the one hand, the joint decision-making functions of management and control led to create an 
organizational rent. On the other hand, this organizational rent can to transform on the 
asymmetric informational rent. 
3. The Stakeholder Governance and the Performance Measurement 
Under the “stakeholder governance”, the concept of “performance” can be conceived in a 
comprehensive framework which reflects a “cooperative game”. 
Indeed, this game is based on a minimum of cooperation between players. In other words, 
players, being rational, are obliged to form coalitions in order to maximize both the total value 
of all the coalitions and the players’ earnings.  
The cooperative game theory is to determine among all possible coalitions which are stable in 
the sense that their members have no incentive to leave them (in order to form other 
coalitions, for example). This stability can be defined under several ways. This is why the 
games theorists are led to introduce what they call “solution concepts”, i.e., the criteria to 
designate the solutions of a game. The cooperative game theory was founded by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in 1942. This theory is considered as a reaction to the Walrasian 
tradition: the behavior can be characterized as simply as in the case of an isolated individual 
who chooses how to allocate his resources efficiently. The Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
critique of Walras General Equilibrium indicates that any individual behavior cannot be 
atomic and independent. Indeed, the coalitions can be formed and the exchanges are designed 
and viewed in a few among coalitions. In such games, there is a steady state where the 
absolute amounts to each will be determined with precision. Note that this solution does 
generally not exist. It is only a theoretical assumption. An exception is given by the zero-sum 
games between two players where they, behaving rationally, can get precisely what the 
solution gives them in terms of earnings. 
The cooperative games which characterized by existing of a formal or implied institutions can 
implement a solution of game. This is the characteristic function as Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern described it. This is a function which guarantees the earnings to the coalition 
members under just for their participation.  
The coalitions in game are with optimal allocations. However, as part of the “stakeholder 
governance” of listed companies, the multiplicity and the complexity of the relations and the 
vague and short-lived character of coalitions can give place only to satisfactory allowances 
not necessarily quite pecuniary. The very nature of the “stakeholder governance” is subject to 
policy changes notably because the existence of individual and/or small groups’ with non-
cooperative behavior. The game of compromise which characterizes the “stakeholder 
governance” may tend to a non-cooperative game. In both cases, the measurement attempt 
reflecting the “True Value Company” is impossible to perform. 
The “balanced scorecard” proposed by Kaplan and Norton (1997) is conceived to take into 
account the past and future multiple sources of Value Company creation and to serve as a 
means of internal communication for all partners. Nevertheless, this means is not completely 
effective because it does not allow the matching of value to its respective sources. Similarly, it 
does not take into account the behavior of agents’ strategies when the decision is implemented 
and when the financial markets impact is caused. 
The “Value Company” is often subject to the strategic manipulation by the insider traders 
and/or the shareholders. The imprecision in the determining value is accentuated when we are 
face to cases dealing with measuring the performance of companies operating in the emerging 
and pre-emerging stock markets. 
By the summary, we can say that the stakeholder approach to measurement of “Value 
Company” remains global, inaccurate and not strategic. 
4. The Governance of the Casablanca Stock Exchange Listed Companies 
The complex relationships between the shareholders and the stakeholders in the Moroccan 
Company and the hybrid nature of its internal management underlie a type of ambiguous and 
hybrid governance in which the main feature is the hierarchy of functions and tasks. The 
result of this is probably the poor quality of management and the big slack of organisation 
chart. This has a negative impact on the future company development and on its external 
position. The Moroccan company is weak-competitive against its rivals. One can only regard 
it as a company seeking rents situations, it does not seek to be sustainable and innovative. She 
does not forge its history and culture. 
What is true for Moroccan companies is also true for its managers. This fact is widely 
recognized in the case of public enterprises. The “Government” as being the “Principal” 
(uninformed party of game) is facing to an “Agent” (informed party) which is enriched 
financially and more rooted in the time. In the developing countries, the “Government” is in a 
situation where he would be unable to reduce the information asymmetry because it deals 
with a coalition deeply rooted and with the behavior is based on fraud, corruption and 
embezzlement of public funds. Generally, in such cases, the “Agent” is not averse for any risk 
because he try to contribute (by fraud) to self-enrich before his eventual dismissal. The second 
best solution of this situation can be the privatization.  
If the company becomes partially private, the managers’ behavior after the privatization (if 
they not be replaced) will change slowly. 
The listed companies in the CSE have the stakeholder governance very complex. It depends 
largely on the organizational structure within its premium business. The administrative and/or 
managerial hierarchy and its roots can be considered the cause of the multiplicity of conflicts 
of interest among stakeholders. 
 
The finding about the good governance of listed companies on the CSE deserves a special 
attention. We see in these modes of business organization that the management and 
governance are heterogeneous, reflecting the situations of agreement and conflict and 
establishing a level playing contradictory based on both conflict and partnership, power 
hierarchical and accountability, the collective irresponsibility in case of crisis or conflict and 
self-accusation (scapegoat) for a major danger. The solution is a game where the equilibrium 
of organization is mixing. It is a mixing of Stacklbergian, Cournotian and Nashian Equilibria.  
The modelling of such a game is a technical problem in which the quality of players and their 
identities are constantly changing and the equilibrium mentioned above may also change. On 
the other hand, the standard Principal-Agent in terms of moral hazard can characterize both 
parties and many more situations where a conflict of interest between managers and their 
partners is revealed. 
Table 2: Stakeholder Matrix: Types of conflicts and types of games 
    Stockholders  Managers  Employees  
There are the cognitive conflicts about 
the choice of investments, about the 
dividends, the determination of the 
Market Value Company (selling price, 
price of the issuing operation), etc. 
Cognitive conflicts, conflicts of 
interest, conflicts about the 
making-decisions and financing 
policy. 
Cognitive conflicts, contractual 
conflicts with moral hazard and 
adverse selection; conflicts about 
cost rationalization, about value-
distribution and participation-
sharing in the case of capital 
increase, etc. 
 
 
 
Stockholders 
  
Type of game: Stackelberg Collusion. Type of game: Nash Equilibria 
in Non-Cooperative Game. 
Type of game: Nash Equilibria 
in Non-Cooperative Game. 
 The CEOs cognitive conflicts, 
Conflicts between the hierarchy 
members about the choice of 
investments and its 
implementation. 
Cognitive conflicts, contractual 
conflicts with moral hazard and 
adverse selection; Conflict about 
the management skills 
remuneration, recruitment, 
working conditions and 
dismissal; conflicts about the 
choice of investment in research 
and development. 
 
Managers  
 
 Type of game: Cournot 
collusion game + Stackelberg 
Collusion. 
Type of game: Nash Equilibria 
in Non-Cooperative Game. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive conflicts, conflicts of 
interest to career advancement, 
contractual conflicts, conflicts 
about reports on the quality of 
employees at work, conflicts 
about power-sharing to strike. 
Employees 
 
 
 
 
 
  Type of game: Cournot collusion 
Game + Nash Equilibria in Non-
Cooperative Game. 
   
A “good governance of companies” requires a permanent internal control provided by the 
shareholders power. 
According to the World Bank3 and International Monetary Fund4 assessments, significant 
progresses in improving corporate governance have been completed. These progresses have 
focused in particular on the Higher Standards for managerial accountability and Shareholders’ 
rights. However, both evaluations have shown the limits of regulatory power in Securities, 
especially that of the Securities Commission (CDVM) for which the power and resources are 
very low. Barriers to effective implementation of laws have been shown. 
Besides, a 2007 International Finance Corporation press release commented that the country’s 
corporate governance was “not in accordance with global standards” and that a national 
corporate governance code to complement existing Moroccan laws and regulations as well as 
the creation of an Institute of Directors of Moroccan corporations was largely needed. 
According to the Saidi and Nadal5 article, the Casablanca Stock Exchange plays an important 
role in the implementation of corporate governance in line with international standards. The 
Casablanca Stock Exchange is the largest market in the Maghreb and the third in Africa, with 
a market capitalization of 73 percent of GDP in 2006 and 98 percent of GDP in 2007. 
However, the Saidi and Nadal article emphasizes that the Moroccan domestic stock market 
still plays a limited economic role which is not proportional to its volume. Among the some 
73 listed companies in 2007, market concentration remains very high (the top two stocks 
(IAM, AWB) account for 40 percent of market capitalization in 2010). 
In its 2009 Doing Business report, the World Bank also describes the Moroccan investor 
protection as being weak. “The indexes vary between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating 
greater disclosure, greater liability of directors, greater powers of shareholders to challenge 
the transaction, and better investor protection. Morocco scores 6.0 in the disclosure index 
against a regional average of 5.9 and an OECD average of 5.9. It scores 2.0 in the Director 
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 World Bank, “Evaluation de la gouvernance d’entreprise au Royaume du Maroc,” May 2003. Available from 
World Bank website. Accessed on March 20, 2009. (in French only) (WB 2003). 
4
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Disclosure,” The Second MENA Regional Forum on Corporate Governance, Beirut, June 3-5 2004. Available 
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Liability Index against a regional average of 4.8 and an OECD average of 5.0 and 1.0 in the 
Shareholder Suits Index against a regional average of 3.7 and an OECD average of 6.6.”6 
4.1. The Characteristics of Listed Companies in Casablanca Stock Exchange  
The average turnover rate of shares does not exceed 10%. There are very few small 
shareholders. The minority shareholders are poorly protected despite the efforts of the judicial 
law of 2004. The capital structure is highly concentrated. Pyramidal structures and cross 
shareholdings between groups remain dominant despite the effort to support the portfolio 
diversification. The most of listed companies are controlled by one or several Moroccan 
and/or Foreign holding companies and are often organized around a financial firm (banks and 
insurance companies). The holding company at the top of the pyramid is not necessarily listed 
in the stock market. 
Most companies listed in the CSE were, initially, public or semi-public. Others are private 
companies whose the capital is open to the domestic and foreign investors (private banks, 
insurance companies and financial groups). A very few family-held companies have been 
listed in the market. 
Concerning the Moroccan public limited companies, the law is modelled on the French 
jurisdiction. It should to have a structure with the Manager namely “Chief Executive Officer” 
(CEO) who represents the company faced with external stakeholders (shareholders, third 
parties, tax authorities, etc.). The CEO is civilly and criminally responsible to shareholders 
and third parties. 
The Moroccan public limited company should to apply an external audit, which is made by 
the auditor. Concerning this subject, the 17/95 law of public limited companies oblige the 
auditors to be responsible to give the good and fair treatment in favor to the all shareholders. 
The auditors shall submit special reports when the sustainability of the enterprise is 
compromised and that the company is in danger of bankruptcy. Indeed, the auditors constitute 
an essential element of good corporate governance. 
However, in the context of information theory, the auditors are available to privileged 
information as well as managers of the company. In this case, the framework of game will 
become increasingly complex. 
Table 1. The no-cooperative game participants. 
The Informed parties The No-informed parties  
The directors;  
The managers; 
The auditors. 
The shareholders; 
The third parties; 
The employees. 
 
The game can be both cooperative and no-cooperative. In the first case, the coalitions are 
formed in order to constitute the parties in game. When participants in the game are 
numerous, the informed players form explicit or implicit coalitions with a large solidarity. 
However, when the conflicts of interest are not exacerbated and the functioning of company 
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 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Doing Business in Morocco: 2009 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. 
Companies,” March 2009. Available from U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State 
website. Accessed on March 17, 2009. (U.S. DoC 2009), quoted by eStandardsForum, Best Practice Report, 
Morocco, 2009, http://www.estandardsforum.org/morocco/standards/principles-of-corporate-governance. 
seems regular, the efforts of uninformed agents are dispersed. Their decisions are not 
consistent and coordinated. The cases of Enron and WorldCom have shown us its false 
healthy image while it headed toward bankruptcy. 
It is noting that no express obligation is required in the broadcasting of the structures of 
governance and the commercial or industrial policies adopted by companies. In addition, it is 
not compulsory to discuss, publicly, the predictable risk factors. 
The shareholders representing 10 % of the capital can make a demand to the court to appoint 
an expert in order to examine a controversial management decision took by board of directors. 
They can institute an action at law against the directors. The compliance with the law is 
ensured by the commercial courts. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for the 
possibility of settling disputes by arbitration.  
It is planned to establish arbitration centers in the chambers of commerce. Today, just the 
International Chamber of Commerce of Casablanca provides the arbitration. The 
disagreements regulation is made by basing on the material evidences. The shareholders 
cannot sue an officer if they have no proof. In the parallel way, the other institutions (the 
Deontological Council for Securities or the Council for the Code of Ethics in Securities 
Markets (CDVM7) and the Managing Company of CSE can exercise some main tasks of 
control and address the penalties and sanctions against the listed companies and brokerage 
firms. However, the control of the public information, the decision power of sanction and the 
financial, technical, institutional and human means of the control authorities are limited. The 
power control of CDVM in terms of procedures and efficiency remains insufficient; it 
depends of the Finance Minister. 
This one strengthens the autonomy of Deontological Council for Securities and its capacity to 
finalize and to concretize its intervention through inquiries and procedures. The penalty power 
wants strengthened but it remains insufficient and difficult to implement it. The reason is the 
lack of the means and control techniques. 
According to the 1-93-212 Law, every person having access to confidential information is 
considered as an informed agent holding privileged and asymmetric information. However, 
the unity control of CSE holds a large power to halt the shares quotation. Until today, no 
lawsuit or criminal charges against insiders have occurred. 
4.2. The Information’s Board Members and Managers, and their Payment  
The presence of one administrator in various boards of various companies can undermine 
transparency. It creates information rents and gives rise to “suspicious” coalitions. 
In order to improve the company functioning and revitalize the Moroccan Stock Market, the 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) may grant some privileges to certain employees or 
shareholders in connection with a capital increase. Article 10 of the Finance Act in 2001 had 
introduced the plans of stock options for employees. Share purchases may be made at a 
discount of up to 10% of the market price and can be used over two years. Employees must 
keep the shares for three years for the capital gain is not taxable. 
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It should be noted that in an economy such as those of Morocco which characterized by 
sluggish and weak Stock Market Transactions, the privileges and incentives to hold the shares 
remain not sufficient, especially when it comes to small shareholders. 
In the case of boards with a single governing body, at least two thirds of the directors cannot 
become managers of the company. They form the supervisory board which oversees the 
conduct of management. Their functions can be summarized in the following points: 
 Establish the board members remuneration; 
 Provide the independent assessment and control;  
 Authorize the Management Board to delegate some of its functions;  
 Give orders to the Management Board to provide the relevant information and 
explanations about the taken decisions, etc. 
It also be noted that the Moroccan company statutes may provide when some important 
management decisions will be taken, the supervisory board should firstly approve it. In the 
case where the supervisory board refuses the approval, the Management Board shall be 
entitled to refer the matter to the Ordinary General Meeting (OGM). This corroborates the 
idea of an ex ante monitoring of the making-decisions; it is a preventive measure to limit or 
thwart any decision which is based on the conflicts of interest. 
The lack of transparency remains a fundamental problem of corporate governance in 
Morocco. Information about the Management Board quality is virtually nonexistent. The 
opacity in the administrative machinery demonstrates the ambiguity of the relationship 
between the director and the president. According to the World Bank Report8, “the MENA 
countries present a model of transparency which is largely limited and hesitant, and it is no 
coincidence that this region is among ones in which the empirical data about the quality of 
governance is weak. No country guarantees to its citizens the right to access to information 
relating to corporate governance, and some even actively try to suppress that right.  
In Morocco, the Code of Good Corporate Governance Practices has been adopted in 2008 
after the joint work of several official and professional bodies (Ministry of Finance, CGEM, 
CDVM, Bank Al-Maghrib, etc.). It is a compendium of guidelines and recommendations 
aligned to the international benchmarks and the principles of good governance set out by 
OECD. 
If the measure deserves a lot of encouragements, what about its implementation? The 
Securities Commission (CDVM) tried to take stock of listed companies’ governance. Among 
75 listed companies that have received the questionnaire, only 46 responded to the questions. 
The results show that good governance is not common for listed companies. Indeed: 
 41% of listed companies have not yet adopted the Moroccan Code of Good Corporate 
Governance Practices; 
 79% of companies still choose to manage with only one-tier board of directors;  
 The separation of powers among the president and general manager for its part is not 
is not respected in 54% of respondents; 
 60% of listed companies don’t have a compensation and appointment committee; 
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 89% of companies in the sample reported having non-executive directors in their 
governance bodies; 
 87% of sampled companies do not broadcast information relating to the executive 
compensation; 
 57% of listed companies haven’t developed the incentive plans for executives and 
employees; 
 90% of companies do not publish quarterly indicators. 
According to the Law No. 20-05-2008 amending Limited Company Law No. 17/95, the 
companies have the choice between a unique board of directors (first case) and a two floors 
structure (second case), which is composed by both a supervisory board and a board of 
directors. In the first case, one person exercises both the control function (Président du conseil 
de surveillance) and the General Manager function (CEO). The CEO represents the company 
as regards to the third parties and has large responsibilities. He can delegate some his 
responsibilities, but remains entirely responsible for any malpractice committed by his 
subordinates. Some Moroccan public companies are adopted the two floors structure in order 
to avoid the large responsibility assumed in the case where there is accumulation of CEO and 
supervisory board director positions. 
In the two cases, the appointment procedures are similar. The law didn’t fix the limit of 
number of boards in which an individual may be a member. Nevertheless, at the same time, 
one member of supervisory council cannot be as a member among in the director’s board. 
However, there is no law provision forbidding the members of supervisory council to be 
engaged by the company. 
5. The Modelling of Contractual Relationship between Shareholders and Managers 
In 1932, Berle and Means found that the new idea of the capitalism is separation between 
ownership and management9. They also found that exist some disconnect between the CEOs 
interests and those of shareholders. 
This managerial approach of the firm was subsequently studied by Jensen and Meckling. 
They had considered that all the relationships established within and outside the firm 
constitute the “nexus of contracts”. 
The problem of moral hazard related to the behavior of the agent (managers) is still valid, 
especially in emerging and developing countries. 
The role of good governance10 is to “secure” and “increase” the financial investment return 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This can be achieved through the establishment of a number of 
organizational and institutional mechanisms based on the control, incentives and participation. 
The moral hazard problem appears when the objectives of the parties signing a contract differ. 
In the case of the shareholders/managers relationship, the managers (considered as 
autonomous) can pursue a strategy that serves their interests at the expense of those of 
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 In the late 1920s, 88 of the 200 largest U.S. firms are headed by a manager. Today it is virtually all medium 
and large enterprises are run by managers. 
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 In the other words, shareholders are looking for by this system of governance the optimality of making 
decisions of managers. They research to know the actions that can reduce the agency cost and lead to the better 
financial performance of the firm. 
shareholders. However, these latter would incentive the managers in order to take the 
decisions that maximize their outcomes. Indeed, two cases may arise: 
 The Principal (Shareholders) can observe the agent’s action (Managers). It is the First-
Best Equilibrium. The Principal in this case may order the agent to choose the effective action 
and then choose the wage that achieves optimal risk sharing between two parties. It is often 
assumed that the Principal is risk-neutral and can justify this assumption if the Principal can 
diversify the risks associated with its relationship with the Agent.11 However, the Agent is 
supposed risk-averse (being small, it is more difficult to him to diversify this risk. The optimal 
risk-sharing requires that the Principal should ensure completely the Agent by paying him a 
constant wage and bear all risks associated with their common activity; 
 In the Second-Best Equilibrium situation, which is among the most common, the 
Principal can observe just the output which is a variable correlated with the Agent’s action. If 
the principal is risk-neutral, the First-Best Solution is to give a constant wage to the Agent. 
But this prompts the agent to choose selfishly action which is least costly for him and not 
optimal in general. This case is widely observed in the Moroccan listed companies, since the 
decisions taken by the managers are slow and less effective. 
Solving the moral hazard problem requires that the principal (shareholders) must offer to the 
Agent a contract which car arbitrates between two things: 
 The risk-sharing, which means that the wage of the Agent depends very lightly in output; 
 The incentives, which pushes the Principal to condition the wage to the output. 
Note that if the Agent is risk-neutral12, the arbitrage cannot take place: the Principal required 
the agent to bear all the risks. In this case, the Second-Best Equilibrium coincides with the 
First-Best Equilibrium (in this case, we say that the Principal sells the company to the Agent).  
However, we note that companies listed in pre-emerging markets (Morocco, among others), 
the agent may accept a contract in spite of the virtual absence of Principal incentive 
constraints. The intention of the agent is to continue his personal interests despite the fact that 
his salary is below to reservation wage. 
5.1. The Model 
Let n  actions a  which taken by the Manager. The n actions are a discrete number: 
{ }
n
aa ,...,1=Α  
These actions13 produce m  outcomes which are noted: 
{ }
m
ooO ,...,1=  
                                                 
11
 In the other words, the shareholders are risk-neutral if they can arbitrate between the risk (bad action taken by 
the Agent and causing a potential loss) and the income given from the Agent good action. 
12
 This case is very inconvenient. Nevertheless, it may appear, usually in developing countries, where the 
enterprises are poorly managed, the control is absent and inefficient. 
13
 We remember that the Agent action is unobservable by the principal. 
It should be noted that the random relationship14, which is an application between the taken 
decisions and the corresponding outcomes, is one-to-one injective function. Note also that the 
output is not known in advance. It is an a priori signal that provides the information on the 
action selected by the Agent. This signal can be simply identified by the surplus of 
relationship. 
For each decision, the surplus is different. It may be high, and also be low. This surplus is just 
an a priori assessment: for each action, we associate a surplus with a probability of 
realization.  
Finally, the probability covers the type of action that the manager can take. 
Proposition 1: The management misperformance in listed companies is an increasing function 
of the lack level of monitoring and opacity of information system. 
The misperformance persistence in listed companies can lead, either to dismiss the officer, 
either to the earlier bankruptcy of company. 
Now, we assume that if the Agent chooses the action ,ia ∈i ],[ DD , the Principal observes the 
outcome jo , ∈j ],[ OO  (the observed outcome is just a signal that may be sometimes, false) 
with a probability ijpi strictly positive.
15
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It is necessary to indicate that: 
 The decisions interval ],[ DD is a compact (bounded and closed). The set of possible 
decisions is finite; 
 The outcomes interval ],[ OO is also a compact (bounded and closed). The set of possible 
outcomes is also finite; 
 The probability law ijpi is an injective function. 
The only publicly observable variable is the outcome of the action taken by the Agent. Here, 
the outcome is measured by financial performance16 of the listed company. Contracts take 
thus necessarily the shape of a reward conditioned in the performance. If the Principal (the 
shareholders) observes the outcome ,jo  he pays to the Agent a salary jw  and keeps 
)( jj wo − for himself. 
                                                 
14
 It defined also as a Technology. 
15
 Note that some probabilities can be zero. In which case, the Principal takes this opportunity to exclude some 
actions. The Principal could then penalize the Agent if the outcome is jo , since the jo observation indicates us 
that the Agent didn’t choose the optimal action ia . 
16
 Performance of listed company is usually measured by the operating profit, the dividend or the PER (Price 
Earnings Ratio) or in the simply way by stock price.
 
The utility function of Von Neumann-Morgenstern for the Agent is: 
awuawU −= )(),(  
where, U  is monotonous17 in the effort and strictly concave; a  is the action corresponding to 
the effort provided by the Agent. 
     
         U  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                  a 
The utility of the Principal is: 
wo −  
5.2. Agent Schedule 
When the Principal offers to the Agent a contract ),( jw the Agent chooses his action by 
solving the following program: 
∑
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−
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So, before signing the contract, the Agent sees if the salary and emoluments, bonuses, 
benefits, decision-power, working conditions are equal to the provided effort or no. 
Proposition 2a: The principle of taxation Hammond, linked to the principle of revelation, 
playing here in full as in the case of adverse selection: The revelation principle states that may 
be limited to direct mechanisms (where the agent announces his information ) and so 
revealing (the optimal Agent strategy is to announce his true type. This is a situation where it 
is in the Agent interest to show the truth). 
Proposition 2b: In the specific context of emerging markets listed companies in where the 
level of opacity and the inefficiency to monitor are very high, the revelation principle does not 
play correctly. Therefore, it is not interesting to the Agent to show his true type. 
                                                 
17
 The assumption of monotonicity of utility function is a standard hypothesis in economic well-being. Agent 
preferences are assumed not saturated and the function is continuous.   
If the agent chooses ,ia  the )1( −n incentive constraints )( kIC are normally checked for each 
nk ,...,1=  and ik ≠ . The incentive constraints are:  
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The agent will accept the contract only and only if it gives him a sufficient utility, which 
equal at least to reservation utilityU , i.e., what he can obtain elsewhere (in the market of 
managers) 18. If the preferred action of the Agent is ia , the participation constraint (or the 
Individual Rationality) is writing as: 
)( IR  Uawu
m
j
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It is rational that the agent accepts the contract if the wage offered by Principal is higher than 
his reservation utility. 
Proposition 3: As part of pre-emerging market listed companies in which the level of 
monitoring managers is low, the contract is based not only on the wage but also on its 
potential strategy to give to Agent the Rooting for empowerment. The agent accepts the 
contract even though the wage offered by Principal is well below his reservation wage. 
In reality, the incentive constraints that the Principal may make will not be implemented: one 
can say that the reward/punishment system has failed. Therefore, a “normal” Agent behavior 
is synonymous with irrationality. It comes: 
)( IR  Uawu
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5.3. The Principal Schedule 
The Principal must choose the contract ),...,( 1 mww which maximizes his expected utility, 
while taking into account the impact of this contract on the Agent decisions. 
wowoV −=),(  is the Principal utility (difference between outcome and Agent wage). 
Indeed, the maximum of his expected utility can be written as: 
∑
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18
 Generally speaking, in the market managers, the average salary is determined in connection with at least three 
factors: the qualifications of manager, the released income and the accumulated experience in the field of 
business management and making-decisions. Thus, it seems that the information about the manager is very 
irrelevant and not complete. We think that the reservation utility of Agent (i.e., his next-best opportunity) does 
not inform us about true quality of the manager. 
under, 
)( kIC     nk ,...,1=  et ik ≠     )( kλ  
)( IR      )(µ  
where ia is the chosen action at the equilibrium and the numbers in parentheses represent the 
multipliers (positive) associated with constraints. Note that the maximization is with respect 
to the wages )( iw and actions ,ia in which the Principal can indirectly control it. 
Under fixing ia , the Lagrangian to Schedule maximization is written as: 
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and its partial derivation from jw gives us the following thing: 
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At first level, we have an efficient sharing of risks, i.e., a constant wage that given by: 
0)(
1 µ=
′ jwu
 
0µ is chosen in order that the individual rationality constraint (IR) is in the equality. The 
difference between these two equations is derived in the positivity of some multiplier kλ . In 
other words, the incentive constraints are saturated at the optimum: some manager’s 
actions ka  give to Agent the same utility as .ia At the equilibrium, there’s at least 
one kλ strictly positive (otherwise, we could neglect the incentive constraints and the moral 
hazard problem would disappear). jw depends on j through the ijkj pipi / terms. 
The ijkj pipi / terms play a fundamental role in the moral hazard problem analysis. Its meaning 
can be found by analogy with the classical mathematical statistics. In fact, the problem of 
Principal is consisting partly to try to infer from the outcomes observation, the action that the 
agent has been chosen. With the statistical terms, given the “sample” jo , the Principal seeks to 
estimate the “parameter” a .  
This problem can be solved by calculating the maximum likelihood estimator of ,a i.e., 
ka such as kjpi is the highest one.  
So there is equivalence between: 
ia , which is the maximum likelihood estimator of a knowing jo  
and, 
,1≤
ij
kj
pi
pi
 k∀  
Now, we are fixing the optimal action ia  ; as all multipliers kλ are nonnegative and u′/1 is an 
increasing function, the wage jw  corresponding to the outcome j will be as high as the 
maximum of likelihood ijkj pipi / will be smaller than 1. Therefore, it will be higher if ia is the 
maximum likelihood estimator of a and knowing :jo  the Principal pays a high wage when he 
observes an outcome which is directly inferred to the optimal action of the Agent. However, 
he will pay a lower wage if he observes that the outcome is very unlikely if the agent has 
actually chosen the optimal action. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, referring to the proposals listed below, we say that it is mandatory and urgent 
to reform the monitoring system of mangers and public information. The incentive constraint 
cannot be implemented in the case where the control system is failed. The lack of information 
efficiency in the pre-emergent market like CSE leads to a large deficit of good governance of 
listed companies. 
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